Greg Detre
@11 on Monday, 15 January, 2001
Brasenose, Large lecture room
his book � �The immaterial self�
5 claims of dualism
most dualists accept a strong version of claim 1
some modern philosophers have gone so far as to deny claim 1 � eliminative materialists
i.e. mentality is not reducible to something else
by analytic reduction
statements about the mental cannot be reducible to statements formulated in wholly non-mentalistic terms, e.g. Ryle, �Concept of mind�
analytical functionalism � mental states are defined by their causal role in the system of input/output, e.g. Sydney Shoemaker. functionalists make no assumptions about the medium, though they usually think in terms of the CNS
however, couldn�t functionalists think in terms of a non-physical medium, in which case they would have a form of dualism
by constitutive reduction
Jones is in pain at t1 = Jones is in a certain functional state at t1
this cannot be re-expressed in any terms that dispense with the psychological terms
but that this fact is constituted in terms of physical terms, i.e. his neural state, his physiology, his surroundings being of a certain type and the laws of nature
mental subject = have the capacity to be in mental states and engage in mental activities
mental items = the concrete ingredients of the mind, e.g. being in pain, episodes of thought, instances of desire
mental items and mental subjects have some similar properties
mental items are wholly non-physical (non-localised, non-spatial)
basic mental subjects (if there are any) are also wholly non-physical
two radical positions of dualism � whether or not there can be basic mental subjects
Cartesian dualism: accepts mental subjects. mental items = elements in the biographies of mental subjects, events of the subject�s being in a certain mental state or mental act
Humean dualism: rejects basic mental subjects. when he focused on his own mental state introspectively, he could only detect the mental items and no self to which they occur; ontologically self-contained instances of mentality which are somehow unified but mentally unattached.
this doddering lecturer likes Cartesian dualism
5 points which establish mentality in the face of eliminative materialism (mental nihilism)
in response, eliminative materialists might argue that we are little different from computers
complex physical gadget, no mentality, but possesses a functional analogue of a mind, since it performs operations which are similar to genuine mental operations, e.g. chess-playing, or a robot with a video camera
we anthropomorphise them and use psychological terms to describe their activity � though these are purely metaphorical
arguments for eliminative materialism
strong version of materalism � concrete reality is physical. usually derives from reverence for physical science and the explanations it can make
shares the dualist claim for a fundamental physical realm. if there was a mental realm, it would have to be something sui generis and fundamental also, but leaves no room for such a realm
what was a mental item? how can mentality be discretely divided up into mental items?
if a machine passed the Turing test, how would that rock the dualist claim?